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WE NEED TO TALK ABOUT POLICE DISCIPLINARY RECORDS
Kate Levine*
In March 2017, an employee of New York’s Civilian Complaint
Review Board leaked the disciplinary record of Daniel Pantaleo to the
media.1 Pantaleo, the police officer who choked Eric Garner to death in
the video2 that went public and horrified many citizens, is under federal
investigation3 after a Staten Island grand jury refused to indict him for
Garner’s death.4 Legal Aid Society attorneys had unsuccessfully sought
the release of his records in the courts for years.5 The leak of his records
is the public face of an important but rarely discussed issue facing police,
legislators, judges, lawyers, and scholars who care both about
transparency for public servants and privacy for individual citizens: how
and when police should be forced to make their disciplinary records
public.
Issues surrounding police accountability are at the heart of both
criminal and racial justice reform. Very public debates are taking place
about community policing, body cameras, prosecutions of individual
officers, and race-based policing. 6 Amidst these debates an equally
important but quieter battle is being waged between the privacy of police
officers and the transparency owed to the public.
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In New York, this battle is over a little-discussed statute that
protects the disciplinary records, and potentially other sources of
information, of individual police officers.7 The statute, New York Civil
Rights Law section 50a (hereinafter section 50-a), is at the heart of
whether Daniel Pantaleo’s disciplinary record should be a matter of
public record or remain private, given the backdrop of privacy concerns
relating to the records of many government and all private employees.8
Beyond questions about Pantaleo’s record is a broader movement
to repeal section 50-a, which scholars and civil rights lawyers contend is
a barrier to police accountability, but police groups insist is an important
protection for the privacy and safety of individual officers. As can be
said for many arguments surrounding policing, this debate pits central
legal and theoretical principles against one another. On the one hand is
the importance of accountability and transparency to ensuring the
working of our democratic system: The police should be accountable to
the public they serve, and many believe that there cannot be
accountability without transparency. On the other hand, there is the
profound and ever-growing issue of privacy and control over one’s
personal and professional information in a world where we are
increasingly surveilled, exposed, and outed by government, social media,
and corporate data entities.9
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There is very little academic writing on the subject, with two notable exceptions.
Cynthia Conti Cook, an advocate and Legal Aid attorney, has both testified in favor of
New York Civil Rights Law section 50’s repeal and written about the problems with the
law in an academic publication. See Cynthia H. Conti-Cook, Defending the Public:
Police Accountability in the Courtroom, 46 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1063, 1075 (2016);
Jonathan Abel, Brady's Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files
and the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 743, 776 (2015)
(reviewing all 50 states’ practices with regard to police misconduct and Brady
obligations and arguing that police disciplinary records should be routinely made
available to criminal defendants).
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There are far too many privacy-related statutes to mention here but two examples
should serve. New York Civil Rights Law section 50 protects not just police records,
but also the records of firefighters, paramedics, and probation officers. Additionally, all
federal employees’ records are jealously guarded by federal statute. Under 5 C.F.R.
Part 293.311, other than basic identifying information, no federal employee’s
information is released to any party without a summons, warrant, or subpoena.
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(Harv. U. Press, 2015) (discussing the ways in which modern behavior exposes us to
surveillance); Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 159, 161
(2015) (arguing that there are constitutional limitations on the ability of the government
to out or disclose intimate information).
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In this essay, I argue that the release of police disciplinary
records requires balancing privacy and transparency values, which differ
depending on when and to whom such records are released. Implicit in
this categorization is the belief that there is value in keeping certain
information about police officers, even information that pertains to their
official functions, private. I will focus on section 50-a, although all
states have some version of this law. In Part I, I argue that the stated
purpose of the law, to prevent defense attorneys from accessing police
disciplinary records during a criminal trial, is the least compelling
justification for police privacy. In Part II, I will then argue that outside
of the courtroom, the release of police records is a much closer question,
one that pits privacy against transparency, not just for police officers, but
also for many thousands of other government employees. Finally, in
Part III, I briefly gesture to the way the debate over police privacy
dovetails with another criminal justice issue: the privacy rights of
formerly incarcerated individuals.
I.

Police Records in the Courtroom

Section 50-a protects police and certain other public employees
from the disclosure of their employment records. Although every state
has some variation of this law, New York’s statute is known to be among
the most protective of officer privacy.10 It states that:
All personnel records used to evaluate continued employment or
promotion, under the control of any police agency . . . shall be
considered confidential and not subject to inspection or review
without the express written consent of such police officer . . .
except as may be mandated by lawful court order.11
As is clear from the quoted portion of the statute above, the default is
privacy, not only in cases like Pantaleo’s, where the request is to make
the record open to the entire public, but also when the request is from a
criminal defendant in a trial where the officer’s credibility is central to
the case. In fact, the lobbying surrounding the law’s passage, reflected
in the stated legislative intent of the law, was to stop defense attorneys

10

COMM. ON OPEN GOV'T, STATE OF N.Y. DEP'T OF STATE, ANNUAL
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND STATE LEGISLATURE 3-5 (Dec. 2014),
http://www.dos.ny.gov/coog/pdfs/2014AnnualReport.pdf (New York’s statute is among
the most protective of police records).
11
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-a (McKinney 2016).
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from accessing the files of officers who would testify against their
clients.12
In numerous cases, New York courts have noted that the very
purpose of the law is to stop defense attorneys from going on a “fishing
expedition” into the record of an officer who has arrested or otherwise
participated in the case against her client.13 Thus, the law insists that the
accused have a “good faith . . . factual predicate” that the record contains
“information, which, if known to the trier of fact, could very well affect
the outcome of the trial.”14 The irony of this standard is immediately
apparent: a defendant must have knowledge that an officer’s disciplinary
record will contain matters relevant to her case before getting a chance to
review the file. How can she know whether such material – kept secret
from her, the judge in the case, and at times even the prosecutor – will
contain relevant information? Yet this is the hurdle she must overcome
to be allowed to examine a police personnel record. Moreover, the New
York Police Department routinely opposes requests for such information,
even opposing in camera review by a judge deciding the motion.15
Judges, who could under the law review such records in camera as a
routine, instead rely on prosecutors to disclose such material if they
know and believe it to be material under their Brady obligation.16 While
prosecutors have access to police records,17 there is no requirement that
they examine such records, nor is scrutiny of records routinized by
district attorneys’ offices.18 The Brady right has been criticized by many
as too narrowly tailored, too favorable to prosecutors, and too easily
eschewed by a prosecutor who wants to keep information from the
defense or who through intentional or unintentional ignorance fails to
discover exculpatory material to turn over to a defendant. As David
12

See People v. Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543, 548 (1979) (discussing legislative intent
of law).
13
See, e.g., Dunnigan v. Waverly Police Dep't, 279 A.D.2d 833, 834 (App. Div. 3,
2001) (“[The statute] is designed to eliminate fishing expeditions into police officers’
personnel files for collateral materials to be used for impeachment purposes . . . .”);
Zarn v. City of N.Y., 198 A.D.2d 220, 220–21 (App. Div. 2, 1993) (same); Capital
Newspapers Div. of Hearst Corp. v. Burns, 109 A.D.2d 92, 95 (App. Div. 3, 1985),
aff’d, 496 N.E.2d 665 (1986) (same).
14
Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543 at 548.
15
See Conti-Cook, supra note 7 at 1075 (noting that the law allows for in camera
review but that this review is often opposed by the police department).
16
Id.
17
See Abel, supra note 7 at Part II (analyzing different states’ rules on prosecutors’
access to police files).
18
Id. at 30 (discussing an interview with a District Attorney in New York, who
admitted she had no formal system for learning impeachment evidence nor any plan to
implement one).
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Sklansky, a former federal prosecutor, puts it, the Brady standard should
be a minimum for prosecutors deciding what information to turn over to
a defendant in a criminal case because it often fails to encompass all of
the relevant evidence that should be disclosed.19 Moreover, as I have
noted in past articles, prosecutors have every incentive to avoid
knowledge of police officer misconduct. First, such misconduct might
hurt her odds of a conviction in an individual criminal case. Second,
close scrutiny of an officer’s record might negatively impact not only a
prosecutor’s all important relationship with that officer but also her
relationship with other officers she will repeatedly need to work with in
future cases.20
Despite the image that the term “fishing expedition” portrays, it
is hard to imagine a less compelling privacy concern than that of a
testifying officer in a criminal case. First, numerous important
constitutional rights weigh in favor of open access for criminal
defendants. These include the right to confront witnesses21 and the right
to obtain any evidence that might be exculpatory. 22 And unlike
prosecutors and judges, defense attorneys are the only actors in a
criminal contest who will scrutinize an officer’s disciplinary record with
their clients’ interest in mind.
As many scholars have noted, a criminal case is often a contest
between police and defendant credibility.23 There are myriad cases when
the police officer is the only witness to the alleged crime and the only
source of information as to the officer’s own actions regarding a suspect
– a person accused of trespassing late at night or burgling an empty store,
for example. Indeed, many drug cases are “buy and busts” in which
police officers pose as drug buyers in order to arrest someone selling
illegal narcotics, meaning that the officer and the defendant are the only
witnesses. Even in cases where there is evidence other than police
testimony, police credibility may be all that stands between a defendant
and conviction. Evidence may only be introduced against a defendant at
a trial if it was seized during a legal search or after a legal arrest. At a
hearing to challenge the introduction of such evidence, the only
19

David Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
Online 25, 33-36 (2017).
20
See Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1447, 146570
21
U.S. Const. Amend. VI (“[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to . . . be confronted with the witnesses against him.”).
22
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (due process requires prosecutors to turn over
discoverable exculpatory material).
23
See, e.g., Paul Butler, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE (The New
Press 2009) 102 (“One of your primary functions as a prosecutor is to make the judge
and jury believe the police.”).
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witnesses will often be the officers who conducted the search and arrest
and the defendant.
At such a suppression hearing, the defense must argue that the
police seized evidence or performed an arrest in violation of the law
when the police themselves claim that the arrest or evidence seizure was
performed legally. This would be a tall order even with an ordinary
witness – the defense must find a way to prove to the judge that the
sworn witness is lying or is not credible. Now, imagine the testimony is
offered by a police officer, a repeat player in the system, with the
implicit and explicit credibility that his office entails, combined with the
institutional and systemic bias in favor of his credibility.24 On the other
side is an accused defendant, often with a criminal history, who is facing
prison if the evidence is admitted or the arrest is allowed. It is not hard
to imagine which story a judge will be inclined to believe, particularly
when the entire case against the defendant may rise or fall on the
outcome of the suppression hearing. Not surprisingly, defendants rarely
win at suppression hearings, 25 despite reams of evidence that police
routinely violate defendants’ rights.26
In these instances, then, it is critical that a defense attorney have
access to the testifying officer’s disciplinary record for several reasons.
A disciplinary record may reveal similar bad behavior by the officer in
past cases. Here is one example: in many drug cases, an officer will
claim that the defendant dropped the narcotics he possessed on the street
just as the officer was arresting him. The defendant, however, may
claim that the police dropped the illegal drugs on the street, picked them
up, and then used that to arrest, search, and discover more drugs on the
defendant’s body. This may seem far-fetched, but anecdotal research
shows that these “dropsy” cases happen more often than we would like
to think,27 particularly where officers believe that a suspect possesses
narcotics but lack reasonable suspicion to search him. A disciplinary
record that shows numerous past complaints of illegal searches related to
24

Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, supra note 20 at 1464.
Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 1, 20 (2001) (“studies have consistently found that successful suppression motions
are quite rare.”).
26
Floyd e.g.
27
See, e.g., Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the
Prosecution, 32 Fordham Urb. L.J. 315, 324 (2005) (noting that “dropsy” testimony
began after the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution and that such testimony
should be, but is not, viewed with suspicion); Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43
Emory L.J. 1311, 1318 (1994) (noting the troubling “repetition of this suspicious story
in case after case that suggests fabrication” but the paucity of examples where such
testimony is disbelieved).
25
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drugs would be extremely relevant to a suppression hearing in a dropsy
case. Yet defense lawyers are routinely denied access to such records,
and the stated intent of the New York law is to prevent the records from
being used in this way.
Those in favor of preventing defense access to disciplinary
records might argue that the defense will use irrelevant, unsubstantiated
allegations to jam up legitimate cases, besmirch the reputation of honest
officers, and taint the factfinders’ impression of the testifying officers’
credibility. Police union representatives go even further, claiming that
“making detailed personal information available to convicted criminals
will potentially put our officers and their families at risk.”28 These
arguments are unconvincing. First, a judge, either at a suppression
hearing or a jury trial, is fully competent to weigh the prejudicial versus
probative impact of police disciplinary records. This is the type of
balancing a judge does with evidence offered to impeach the credibility
of any witness. Second, the institutional biases in favor of police officers
are so strong that it is hard to imagine even credible, substantiated
disciplinary infractions dramatically changing the number of cases where
evidence is suppressed or where a defendant is acquitted. Finally, there
is no evidence or reason to suspect that making police disciplinary
records available to defense attorneys will make officers and their
families less safe. While police officers face difficult and dangerous
situations as part of their jobs, officer safety cannot be used to defeat
legitimate legal arguments in favor of criminal defendants. If, somehow,
an officer’s safety will be at risk based on something in his record, a
judge is competent to make that determination and redact that portion of
the record.
II.

Releasing Police Records to the Public

Thus, the reason behind New York’s law protecting police
officers’ privacy is the worst defense of the law. Some have used this to
argue that the law should be repealed entirely.29 This, I believe, is a
mistake. While police officers are public servants, which makes
transparency central to their accountability, that principle must be
weighed against the equally important principle of individual privacy.
28

Brenda J. Lyons, State Committee Urges Cuomo, Legislators to Open Police Files
TimesUnion, (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Report-sayspolice-files-should-be-open-to-public-5967527.php#page-1.
29
See, e.g., Daniel Denver, New York’s police secrecy law: de Blasio fights to keep
NYPD abuse records from the public, Salon (June 29, 2016) (noting that “the
Committee on Open Government, an independent state agency, called for the
legislature to make repealing or reforming 50-a a priority.”).
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While this should hold little sway when the accountability is to a
criminal defendant facing the loss of liberty, we should be much more
careful when the call is to expose disciplinary records to the public.
Take the case of Officer Pantaleo. There is much to the argument that he
should have been indicted by a Staten Island jury, but he was not. Yet he
is currently under investigation by a federal grand jury. While this
investigation is ongoing, the publicity of his record might well taint the
jury’s consideration of the charges against him, the same way publicity
of facts against any defendant might impact a jury considering her fate.
The frustrations of community members who see police act with
impunity is wholly justified, but publicly shaming a criminal suspect
who may be indicted by a grand jury is a short-term strategy that does
little to rectify the problematic culture which leads to police brutality.30
More globally, we should be asking ourselves what implications
flow from the argument that all police disciplinary records should be
made public. As discussed above, some of the allegations against an
officer will likely be false, or at least unsubstantiated. The public does
not have the mandate or the institutional competence that a judge or
lawyer might have when considering different levels of complaintsubstantiation. Perhaps even more importantly, the knowledge that
records will be made public will affect how complaints are dealt with by
those charged with investigating officers. The CCRB or the internal
investigators in a police department may decline to vigorously
investigate charges against an officer if they believe that whatever they
discover will be laid bare. Police departments are already notoriously
hesitant to fire bad officers,31 and will be even less likely to do so if
incentives exist for an officer’s misconduct to go unrecorded. This holds
not just for officers who commit violent arrests or brutalize citizens, but
also for those officers who show their unfitness in other ways – racism or
sexism toward other officers, alcohol or drug related problems on the
job, allegations of dishonest overtime reports, and countless other ways
in which an officer might show himself unfit to serve the public long
before he does something outwardly violent to a citizen. We need to
strengthen the internal control over police officers and, while
transparency may help to force police departments to fire the worst
officers, it may also retard their efforts to collect information on their
employees, cause them to circle wagons even more tightly, and give
them another reason to refuse to engage with the community.
30

Cf. Police Suspects, supra note 6 (arguing that rather than strip police of
specialized interrogation rights, we think about how extending those rights to all
suspects might aid in criminal justice reform).
31
See, e.g., Mike Riggs, Why Firing A Bad Cop is Damn Near Impossible, REASON
(Oct. 19, 2012).
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Moreover, all government employees benefit from privacy
protections that stop their records from becoming public.32 While it is
certainly possible to argue that the police serve a unique function in our
society that makes their record-transparency particularly important, it is
not far-fetched to assume that transparency-related arguments could be
made in favor of publicizing the records of public school teachers, public
university employees, firefighters, doctors and nurses who work at
publicly funded hospitals, and a whole host of other employees. At some
early point in the debate over the publication of officer records, we must
consider how such arguments affect other government and governmentfunded employees.
Part III. Police Records as Criminal Records
There are also criminal justice-related legal and policy concerns
lurking just downstream from the question of police privacy matters.
The privacy versus transparency debate impacts another, far less
institutionally powerful group of individuals whose lives are constantly
affected by the specter of public-outing:
formerly incarcerated
individuals. Whether, how, and for how long to publicize the criminal
records of those who have served their sentences and are attempting to
reintegrate into society are questions that scholars and politicians are
addressing in several forms.33 Recent academic literature, with notable
exceptions,34 tends to come down squarely on the side of more privacy
for these individuals.35
32

There are far too many privacy-related statutes to mention here but two examples
should serve. New York Civil Rights Law section 50, protects not just police records,
but also the records of firefighters, paramedics, and probation officers. Additionally,
federal employees’ records are protected by federal statute. Under 5 C.F.R. Part
293.311, other than basic identifying information, a federal employee’s information is
not released to any party without a summons, warrant, or subpoena.
33
See, e.g., Michelle Natividad Rodriguez & Beth Avery, Ban the Box: U.S. Cities,
Counties, and States Adopt Fair Hiring Policies, Nat’l Employment Law Project (Apr.
1, 2017), http://www.nelp.org/publication/ban-the-box-fair-chance-hiring-state-andlocal-guide (describing various reforms implemented to protect formerly incarcerated
peoples’ records).
34
James Jacobs, Is Employment Discrimination Against Ex-Offenders Immoral, The
Volokh Conspiracy (Feb. 2, 2015) (arguing employers should have access to criminal
records because “more information is always preferable to less information.”)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/02/02/isemployment-discrimination-against-ex-offenders-immoral.
35
See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, Criminal Employment Law (forthcoming Cardozo L. Rev.)
(impact of criminal record on hiring decisions), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2944840; Eisha Jain, Prosecuting
Collateral Consequences, 104 Geo. L.J. 1197, 1198 (2016) (considering prosecutors’
role in collateral consequences of criminal record).
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Formerly incarcerated private citizens are haunted by their
criminal records for decades after they complete their sentences. 36
Criminal records are used to deny them food stamps, housing, and voting
rights.37 But more importantly for purposes of this essay, they are made
available to employers, educational institutions, and professional
organizations.38 The argument for publicizing these records is that the
public has a right to know if someone has been convicted of a crime and
to make a decision about that person’s employability, institutional
competency, and dangerousness based on those records. Critics of
publicizing criminal records argue that they often provide little accurate
information about a person but are almost insurmountable obstacles to
achieving full reintegration into society. They become a perpetual
punishment in the form of lack of access to civil society long after a
person’s punishment is meant to be over.
The arguments in favor of making officer disciplinary records
public are undeniably similar to those for criminal records. As a police
officer, one gives up her right to privacy because the public has a right to
know whether or not she is fit to be an officer. While there are major
differences to be sure between police disciplinary records and criminal
records, further inquiry may find that the arguments in favor of
transparency and privacy are equally compelling and equally overstated
for each.39
Conclusion
The purpose of this essay was twofold: to address the backward
nature of New York’s police record privacy law, and to begin to raise
questions about how police disciplinary records should be handled more
broadly. How we protect or expose the behavior of police reveals much
about our commitment to privacy and transparency not only for police,
but for other government employees, and for all those affected or
involved in the vast and record-thick criminal justice system.

36

Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1789, 1790 (2012) (collateral consequences for “tens of
millions” with criminal records).
37
Id. at 1799-1803.
38
Levin, supra note 35, at passim (employment, though critical to reintegration, is
made very difficult for those with criminal records).
39
This is the subject of a future project. Here I merely suggest that inquiry could lead
to important similarities.

